After Housing Curbs, Why Prices Barely Fall

Opening: A Counterintuitive Phenomenon

According to analysis of the real price registration database, the median unit price for residential buildings nationwide went from 361,000 NTD/ping in Q2 2024 to 357,000 NTD/ping in Q1 2026—a two-year decline of only 1.1% (essentially can be viewed as not falling at all). Over the same period, transaction volume collapsed from 37,844 transactions to 10,258 transactions—a decline of 72.9%.

Volume collapsed by seventy percent, price fell barely one percent. This isn't something that can be brushed aside with the word "frozen"—this is a phenomenon that needs explanation.

This article examines using three layers: first confirm the facts of "why prices don't fall," then find the forces supporting prices from supply, demand, and institutional aspects, finally piece these clues into a complete picture.

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First Layer: Fact Confirmation—Not All Houses Are "Price Stable"

First, the full picture. Over the same period (2024Q2→2026Q1), the performance of four major housing types:

Type	2024Q2 Unit Price	2026Q1 Unit Price	Change
Residential Buildings (Nationwide)	361k NTD/ping	357k NTD/ping	-1.1%
Walk-up Apartment	292k NTD/ping	284k NTD/ping	-2.7%
Apartment	338k NTD/ping	323k NTD/ping	-4.4%
Townhouse	287k NTD/ping	273k NTD/ping	-4.9%

Source: Real Price Registration Database (excluding special transactions)

Residential buildings are the "most price stable" type, with a decline only 20% to 40% of other housing types. Apartments and townhouses declined about 4-5%, walk-ups about 3%. In other words, "prices don't fall" isn't universal—it's concentrated in the residential building product type specifically.

But "barely falling" is a nationwide average, and individual districts can vary widely. This is worth keeping in mind, because supply-demand structures, owner holding costs, and buyers' capacity to absorb all differ from area to area.

Why residential buildings?

Second Layer: Supply Side—Reluctance to Sell and Cost Structure

Homeowners Have No Urgent Selling Pressure

After housing curbs, people who want to buy can't get loans, but people who want to sell aren't willing to lower prices—both sides stalemate, transactions freeze.

Homeowners of residential buildings mostly acquired at low prices before 2020, with low holding costs and no urgent financial selling pressure. Preferring "not sell rather than lower price" is a rational choice. When most sellers in the market hold the same mindset, prices lose downward momentum.

Low Holding Cost Institutional Support

According to Ministry of Finance data, self-use housing tax rate is 1.2%, land value tax for self-use is 2‰. Taking a 15 million NTD house in Taipei as an example, assessed current value is approximately 2 million, self-use housing tax approximately 24,000 NTD/year. Figure tool station calculation shows total holding costs including management fees and repair funds approximately 0.4%-0.7% of housing price, if calculating pure tax burden only approximately 0.17%.

Low holding costs mean the cost of "holding and waiting" isn't high. Sellers can wait for market recovery without needing to dump at low levels.

Limited Impact of House Tax 2.0

House Tax 2.0 went into effect July 2024, tax collection began May 2025, non-self-use residential housing tax rates increased to 2%-4.8%, adopting national householding and full accumulation. But this mainly affects multiple property owners, with limited impact on single self-use residential building owners.

In other words, housing curbs target speculative holding, but the main holders of residential buildings are self-occupiers and long-term investors—these two groups have low sensitivity to holding costs, so policy effects are naturally limited.

Third Layer: Demand Side—Rigid Demand and Rental Market Push

Rigid Demand Supports Low-Level Buying

Residential buildings are the mainstream product in urban areas, with best liquidity and most concentrated rigid demand and upgrade demand. Even with transaction volume contraction, there's still self-use demand buying at low levels, supporting unit prices.

This can be seen from monthly data: residential building unit prices throughout 2025 consolidated at 360-370k NTD/ping, with 3,000-4,000 transactions monthly. This isn't "nobody buying"—it's a stalemate of "people who want to buy can't get the price they want, people who want to sell aren't willing to lower prices."

Rental Market Doesn't Protect Tenants, Forced to Buy

According to Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Finance data, in 2019 there were approximately 1.02 million rental households nationwide, but only 320,000 houses declared rental income—nearly 70% of rental houses didn't declare rental income. The rental market is opaque, tenant protections are insufficient, forming a push force: people capable of buying tend to buy for stability.

Auditor General's Year 111 (2023) report shows rental subsidy execution rate only 55.74%, with Taipei City 20.47%, New Taipei City 41.18%, Taichung City 23.02%, Kaohsiung City 0.52%. Policy visible but unreachable, tenants find it harder to rent with peace of mind.

What about the Rental Special Law amendment? Originally planned to guarantee at least 3-year lease terms, restrict renewal rent increases, but July 2026 amendment took sharp turn—3-year lease guarantee, renewal rent increase cap temporarily suspended, prioritizing provisions with higher consensus instead. As of July 2026, the amendment draft is still under Executive Yuan review.

The protections tenants need most are stuck.

This isn't saying "tenants don't want to rent"—it's "tenants dare not rent with peace of mind." Unstable leases, landlords might raise rents or take back property anytime, subsidies can't be applied for—these uncertainties stack up, forming a push force: people capable of buying tend to buy for stability.

This isn't investment motivation—it's demand for residential peace of mind. When renting cannot provide peace of mind, buying changes from "choice" to "have to."

Fourth Layer: Structural Aspect—Real Estate Is Taiwanese People's Most Important Asset

According to Directorate General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics Year 112 (2023) National Wealth Statistics, household sector assets are primarily real estate, accounting for 30.50%, followed by life insurance reserves and pension reserves 21.78%, securities 18.05%, cash and demand deposits 13.54%.

At end of Year 112 (2023), household sector net worth 171.53 trillion NTD, accounting for 67.85% of all economic sectors, highest proportion. Average household wealth 18.89 million NTD, of which real estate 5.76 million NTD.

Real estate accounts for 30% of household assets, the largest single asset. This isn't a short-term phenomenon—it's a long-term structure. Taiwanese families "bet" their wealth on real estate, demand is high long-term, this is the fundamental support maintaining high prices.

Synthesis: Three Forces Stack Together, Forming Price Support

Piecing together the clues from three layers:

Supply side: Homeowner holding costs low, no urgent selling pressure, prefer not to sell rather than lower prices → supply rigidity

Demand side: Insufficient rental protections, capable people forced to buy for stability; rigid demand supports low-level buying → demand has floor

Structural aspect: Real estate accounts for 30% of household assets, long-term structural demand → underlying support

These three forces stack together, forming a complete narrative of "homeowners don't lower prices, tenants forced to buy, long-term demand supports."

Residential buildings are the most extreme manifestation of this structure: they're the mainstream urban product (rigid demand most concentrated), owners mostly long-term holders (reluctance to sell mindset strongest), tenants most likely want to buy them (rental insecurity push greatest). So residential buildings' "price stable volume shrink" is most extreme—volume fell 72.9%, price only fell 1.1%.

Ending: Understanding Structure, Then Judging Trends

Understanding these forces isn't for despair—it's for understanding—understanding why housing curbs barely bring down prices, understanding why "volume collapse" doesn't bring "price collapse," understanding why residential buildings are the most extreme manifestation of this phenomenon. With that understanding, judgment stands on firmer ground.

A signal worth watching: monthly data from the real price registration database shows residential building unit prices ranging between 355k and 369k NTD/ping in Q2 2024, and between 351k and 362k NTD/ping in Q1 2026—two years locked in a narrow 350k-370k NTD/ping band. Early 2026 saw a dip to 351k (February) before rebounding to 355k in March. Whether this is "the beginning of a price correction," the sample is still insufficient to conclude (samples from May 2026 onward remain incomplete). But volume is price's leading indicator—after volume collapses, price correction typically lags by 2-4 quarters.

Disclaimer: This article is market data compilation and analysis, does not constitute any investment advice.